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‘She, of Course, Holds No Political Opinions’: Gendered Political Opinion 
Ground in Women’s Forced Marriage Asylum Claims 
 
Abstract 
Women continue to face challenges in having their asylum claims recognised under the Refugee 
Convention. This is to a significant extent due to the ways in which the Convention is applied to 
women’s claims, and is particularly the case in gender-based persecution claims. While there have 
been important advances in the field of gender and refugee law, contributing to an improved 
understanding of the relevance of gender within international refugee law, there remains a need for 
more gender-sensitive interpretations of the Convention. This article critiques the ways in which the 
political opinion ground of the Refugee Convention has been applied to some women’s forced 
marriage claims in the UK. Women’s gender-based persecution claims are often categorised under 
the membership of a particular social group ground and the political opinion ground remains an 
underused and narrowly interpreted category. Drawing on feminist critiques, it is argued that this 
demonstrates an underlying gendered politics, and that the political opinion ground can indeed be 
relevant to women’s asylum claims involving forced marriage. Women’s resistance to their 
gendered oppression in the form of forced marriage should be seen as a valid expression of their 
political opinion and agency. 
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Introduction 
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Although in the original text of the Refugee Convention gender was explicitly excluded as a ground 
for persecution justifying the granting of refugee status, significant advances have been made in 
recognising the relevance of gender in relation to refugee law. When the Refugee Convention was 
drafted, gender was discussed only once and the suggestion by a Yugoslav delegate to include the 
category of sex in the non-discrimination Article 3 was quickly rejected (Spijkerboer 2000: 1). The 
approach at the time was exemplified by the British delegate’s pronouncement ‘that the equality of 
the sexes was a matter for national legislation’ (2000: 1). The Chairman of the drafting conference, 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees van Heuven Goedhart, strongly doubted that there would 
ever be any refugee cases on account of sex (2000: 1). From the time of the adoption of the 
Convention till around 1980s, the specific gender-based concerns of asylum-seeker women mostly 
remained invisible. 
 
It is largely due to NGOs, feminist activists and academics that this invisibility of gender-
based concerns of asylum-seeker women has been exposed and brought on to the agenda (Edwards, 
2010: 22). Feminists have been critiquing the supposed gender neutrality of the refugee definition 
for decades (Arbel, Dauvergne and Millbank, 2014, Crawley, 2001, Greatbatch, 1989, Indra, 1987). 
Early critiques of the absence of gender as a sixth category (in addition to race, nationality, religion, 
political opinion and membership of a particular social group (PSG)) argued that this meant that 
gender-related persecution was trivialised and that trying to deal with this type of persecution 
through the analysis of the other categories was insufficient (Stevens, 1993: 214). Others pointed 
out that a separate category might lead to all persecution of women being thought of as falling 
within a single category, leading to perceptions that women’s persecution was always something 
fundamentally different than men’s, and by inference perhaps something less important (Freedman, 
2015: 75). In practice, however, it has been accepted that the international political climate has not 
been conducive to the expansion of the refugee definition by way of including gender as a sixth 
category (Copeland, 2003: 101). Efforts have therefore turned to the interpretation of the 
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Convention and its practical application. According to current feminist critiques, the problem is not 
the Convention per se, but rather the ways in which women’s experiences are ‘actually represented 
and analytically characterised’ within refugee determination processes (Crawley, 2000: 19). 
 
There is thus a need to examine the specific ways in which adjudicators deal with gender-
based persecution claims. Gender-based persecution has been conventionally characterised under 
the PSG ground, leading to the underuse of the political opinion ground. However, is this selection 
the most appropriate and what does it tell about the ways in which the Refugee Convention is 
interpreted in relation to women’s experiences? 
 
In this article, forced marriage is examined as one type of gender-based persecution claim in 
which the political opinion ground has been underused and narrowly interpreted. The argument 
advanced is that its interpretation reveals the gendered politics at play in the context of refugee 
determinations in which the rights pertaining to gender (and also sexual orientation) are yet to be 
fully realised. The article therefore explores the specific ways in which the political opinion ground 
is understood by adjudicators and the implications it may have on women’s claims.  
 
The first part of the article discusses the developments in international refugee law in 
relation to gender-based persecution. It looks at why women’s claims involving gender-based 
persecution conventionally fall under the PSG, and why this might not always be the most 
appropriate one. The second part examines this tendency in light of feminist critiques of the 
public/private dichotomy and its effects on the gendered and partial ways in which the political 
opinion has been interpreted. The argument advanced is that the distinction between the public and 
private spheres underlines the framing of women asylum seekers’ experiences of gender-based 
persecution as ‘private’, thereby constructing women as social and cultural actors as opposed to 
political ones. This restriction to the ‘private’ may prevent us from appreciating the political nature 
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of women asylum seekers’ claims. The third part draws on my research into women’s asylum 
appeals claims involving forced marriage between 2004 and 2014. Most of these cases were 
advanced under the PSG ground but in two cases the political opinion ground was also advanced. 
While the conceptual overlap between the two grounds is recognised, this section illustrates how 
adjudicators have construed the political opinion ground narrowly. As explained in part three, due 
to the ways in which these types of cases are published, it is not possible to evaluate how 
representative of forced marriage claims in general they are. However, the manner in which the 
political opinion ground has been discussed can shed light on the ways in which women’s 
experiences are represented and their claims are categorised. The argument advanced is that 
resistance to forced marriage can be seen as political and becomes as such due to the context in 
which that resistance takes place. To understand refusal of a forced marriage as a valid expression 
of political opinion and agency avoids the de-politicisation of womens’ claims and allows the 
recognition of the personal as political.  
Establishing the Convention Ground 
 
The Refugee Convention defines a refugee as a person who has a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a PSG or political opinion 
(Article 1 A). When a State makes a refugee status determination, the asylum seeker must prove 
that she has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of one or more of these Convention 
grounds. The legal claim of persecution is conducted by demonstrating ‘serious harm’ in 
combination with a ‘failure of State protection’. The manner in which these aspects are evaluated 
may have adverse gender-based effects on women’s claims of asylum. 
 
Regarding the evaluation of a relevant convention ground, gender-based persecution has 
generally been considered to fall within the category of PSG. The UNHCR has, over the years, 
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given guidance to States on the manner in which gender-based persecution should be interpreted. In 
1985, the UNHCR recommended (in Conclusion 39) that ‘women asylum seekers who face harsh or 
inhumane treatment due to the values of their society may be considered as a particular social group 
under Art 1 A (2)’.  
 
Moreover, in 1991 the UNHCR Executive Committee’s Guidelines on the Protection of 
Refugee Women recommended that ‘women...fearing persecution or severe discrimination on the 
basis of their gender’ should be considered a member of a PSG and that ‘others may be seen as 
having made a religious or political statement in transgressing the social norms of their society’ 
(UNHCR ExComm, 1991: ¶ 71). 
 
Already two decades ago, then, the UNHCR made clear that some women’s gender-based 
persecution claims that included transgressing ‘social norms of their society’ could be appropriately 
determined under political or religious convention grounds. However, as the Guidelines are not 
binding on States, the UNHCR can only hope that States adopt more favourable practices and 
policies (Macklin, 1998: 29). As late as in 1996, the British Home Office stated that Conclusion 39 
imposed no obligation on State parties to recognise women as a social group (Macklin, 1998: 29). 
Nevertheless, the Guidelines have been described as carrying considerable weight as they provide 
authoritative guidance on legal interpretations of the Conventions (Foster, 2007: 71, Juss, 2013). 
 
 It can be said that the 1991 Guidelines did pave the way for future developments in the 
area of gender and asylum. In 1993, the UNHCR Executive Committee encouraged States to 
develop ‘appropriate guidelines on women asylum-seekers, in recognition of the fact that women 
refugees often experience persecution differently from refugee men’ (UNHCR ExComm, 1993). 
Between 1995 and 1999, the Executive Committee made repeated calls on States to develop and 
implement guidelines that recognised women’s gender-related claims.1 The sustained criticism 
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from the various fronts was strong enough finally to get some States to react. Decision-making 
authorities in Canada were the first to introduce Gender Guidelines (IRB, 1993). This was 
followed by the USA and Australia (INS, 1995, DIMA, 1996). Swedish, Swiss and German 
legislators also inserted amendments to their domestic legislation (Spijkerboer, 2000: 3). In the 
UK, The Refugee Women’s Legal Group (RWLG), a non-profit organisation, proposed Guidelines 
in 1998. The UK Immigration Appellate Authority (IAA) used much of the content of these 
guidelines in its own (albeit shortened) Guidance for decision-makers (IAA, 2000) and the Home 
Office issued an Asylum Policy Instruction to its decision-makers on ‘Gender Issues in the 
Asylum Claim’ (Home Office, 2004, updated 2007). However, scholars and refugee advocacy 
organisations have criticised the Home Office for not adhering to its Guidelines (see eg. Baillot et 
al., 2014; Ceneda and Palmer, 2006). 
 
 These changes were a response to an increasing number of claims by women on the basis 
of gender-related persecution such as rape, domestic violence and ‘traditional practices’ like 
female genital mutilation (FGM) (Beyani, 1995: 31). The developments occurred parallel to 
developments in general international law, international human rights law as well as criminal law. 
It is fair to say that considerable efforts have been made to raise the profile of women’s rights 
(Kneebone, 2005; 19). For instance, in 1993 the UN proclaimed a Declaration on the Elimination 
of Violence Against Women (DEVAW), which defined violence as occurring in both public and 
private spheres and was followed in 1994 by the appointment of a Special Rapporteur on Violence 
Against Women (United Nations, 1994). In 1996, the Special Rapporteur specifically 
recommended that ‘refugee and asylum laws should be broadened to include gender-based claims 
of persecution, including domestic violence’ (United Nations, 1996: 39). And in her 2003 Report, 
Coomaraswamy stated that, despite progress in some areas, ‘in general States are failing in their 
international obligations to effectively prevent, investigate and prosecute violence against women’ 
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and that ‘violence against women continues in the family, in the community, and is perpetrated 
and/or condoned by the State in many countries’ (United Nations, 2003a). 
 
 During the negotiation of the Refugee Convention in the 1950s, the first four grounds for 
persecution (race, religion, nationality and political opinion) were considered in draft form by the 
conference of plenipotentiaries. The fifth (PSG) was introduced at a later stage by the Swedish 
representative (United Nations, 1951). This ground was eventually included in the final 
Convention, but there is not much comment on this issue in the travaux préparatoires. Grahl-
Madsen (1966: 219) describes this addition as an ‘afterthought’, as a way to protect against 
persecution based on unforeseen reasons. Given that there is no explanatory historical material, it 
is unsurprising that the PSG ground is the one with the least clarity, resulting in ‘different 
approaches between and even within jurisdictions, both in terms of principles and framework 
adopted to guide interpretation and in the application of these principles to particular fact 
scenarios’  (Hathaway and Foster, 2003: 477).  
 
 This lack of clarity has significant consequences for women’s claims, given that so many 
of the gender-based claims are made in reference to PSG. Indeed, as Edwards (2010: 28) notes, 
PSG ‘has now become a default ground for women’s claims, even when one or more of the other 
grounds may be equally, or more applicable’.  
 
 Within UK jurisprudence, the judgment of Islam v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department; R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Another, ex parte Shah [1999] UKHL 20 
paved the way for an acceptance of women as a PSG Shah and Islam was a case of joined appeals 
by two women from Pakistan who applied for asylum in the UK fearing that if returned they 
would be subjected to domestic violence from which there was no state protection as well as 
severe sanctions arising from false allegations of adultery. Shah had suffered domestic violence 
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throughout her marriage. After leaving and coming to the UK, she discovered that she was 
pregnant and her seventh child was born in the UK. She applied for asylum fearing that if returned 
her husband would accuse her of adultery and subject her to criminal proceedings for the offence 
of ‘sexual immorality’ for which punishment was flogging or stoning to death. Islam had also 
suffered abuse from her husband since the early stage of their marriage. A fight between two 
politically opposed groups had broken out in the school where she was teaching and she had 
intervened. Although she had not intervened for a political reason, one of the groups regarded her 
actions as such and for this she suffered harassment from supporters of one of the groups and 
accusations of adultery were made against her to her husband. Her husband subsequently beat her 
and she ended up in hospital. After receiving further harassment she fled to the UK. Both women 
claimed persecution for the reason of PSG but Islam also claimed persecution for reasons of 
political opinion. The judgment makes only cursory remarks on this point, considering instead 
what the Lords thought was the principal issue, namely the meaning and application of the PSG. 
The House of Lords accepted that ‘women in Pakistan’ was a PSG within the meaning of the 
Refugee Convention. 
 
 Prior to the House of Lords decision, several Tribunal cases dealing with claims under this 
ground had failed (Kelly, 2010: 11). Specifically in relation to women subjected to FGM, 
Tribunals had found it difficult to decide whether the claimants could be considered to fit into a 
PSG. When the question of whether women could constitute a PSG came to the House of Lords in 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v K; Fornah v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2006] UKHL 46, Baroness Hale stated that “the answer… is so blindingly obvious 
that it must be a mystery to some why [the cases] had to reach this House” (¶ 83). The debate, as 
in so many similar cases, was about the definition of the PSG - whether to accept a broader group 
of ‘women in Sierra Leone’ or the so-called ‘ “intact” women’ group. 
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 The overall tendency to characterise women’s claims as coming under the PSG ground is 
problematic, particularly in circumstances where they could also or be characterised as involving 
the political opinion ground or at least a combination of the two grounds. Indeed, Harvey (1999) 
has asked should we not consider an imputed political opinion within the context of Shah and 
Islam? In other words, if feminism has cast the personal as political, should not the localised 
resistance to private displays of power, in the general societal context, which existed in Pakistan, 
not be today regarded as the expression of a political opinion? (Harvey, 1999: 239). Similar 
critiques of the PSG ground were advanced in relation to US jurisprudence. In the ground-
breaking American case of Matter of Kasinga 21 I. & N. 357 (BIA 1996), the Board of 
Immigration Appeals granted asylum to a young woman from Togo who fled a threat of FGM and 
forced marriage. 
 
 When accepting that Fauziya Kasinga was a member of a PSG, Board Member Rosenberg 
said that: 
‘[U]nlike requests for asylum premised upon political opinion, social group claims, like 
those involving race, ethnicity, or religion, are status based and do not necessarily require a 
showing of the presence of an individual’s opinions or activities’ (375). 
 
While the case was an important precedent in recognising that women fleeing gender-based 
persecution in the form of FGM could be eligible for asylum in the United States, it also evidenced 
some concerns about the interpretation of PSG and political opinion grounds. Rosenberg’s 
characterisation of social group on the basis of social and cultural status that is contrasted with 
political and legal status implicitly uses a very narrow idea of political opinion (Kneebone 2005: 
23). After all, a woman’s legal and political status is often indistinguishable from her social and 
cultural status (2005: 23). By opposing such practices as FGM and forced marriage - intimately tied 
 10 
with patriarchal power structures- a woman is expressing her political opinion. Indeed, this is 
explicitly recognised by the Canadian Guidelines, which state that: 
‘A woman who opposes institutionalized discrimination against women, or expresses views 
of independence from male social/cultural dominance in her society, may be found to fear 
persecution by reason of her actual political opinion or a political opinion imputed to her 
(i.e. she is perceived by the agent of persecution to be expressing politically antagonistic 
views),’ 
 
 Even though PSG has become the default position for women’s claims it does not come 
without its unique challenges. For instance, when it comes to recognising ‘women as a PSG’, 
Foster notes that advocates and decision-makers continue to insist on overly convoluted and 
artificially contrived groups in order to avoid concerns over ‘floodgates’ (2014: 38). This is 
despite the fact that whether a group is small or large does not prevent it from being recognised as 
a PSG. As noted by Gleeson CJ in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar 
[2002] 210 CLR 1, ‘it is power, not number, that creates the conditions in which persecution may 
occur’. The second problem with the PSG ground is that there exists two distinct approaches to its 
interpretation: the so-called ‘protected characteristics’ and ‘social perception’ approaches.2 In brief 
terms, the two approaches can be summarized as follows. The protected characteristics approach 
examines ‘whether a group is united by an immutable characteristic or by a characteristic that is so 
fundamental to human dignity that a person should not be compelled to forsake it’ (UNHCR: 
2002b). Sex would be considered an immutable characteristic (UNHCR: 2002b). Whilst the social 
perception approach considers whether or not a group shares a common characteristic which 
makes them a cognizable group or sets them apart from society at large’ (Edwards: 2003: 71). A 
comprehensive analysis, particularly with regards to the divergent jurisprudence arising from the 
two approaches, has been provided by Foster (2014). For the present purposes it suffices to note 
that while the UNHCR has tried to negotiate these approaches in its guidance to states, there 
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remains considerable uncertainty over the interpretation of the PSG (Foster, 2014:38). 
Furthermore, despite the arguments in favour of recognising women as a PSG, feminists have 
cautioned against the assumption that women share common experiences, which can be explained 
by reference to their gender alone (Crawley: 2001: 73). It has been further pointed out that treating 
women as a cohesive group risks essentialising gender differences and portraying refugee women 
as ‘victims’ of their ‘barbaric cultures’ (Razack: 1995, Oswin: 2001). 
 The third problem is that from a feminist perspective, constructing women’s claims purely 
under PSG can serve to de-politicise their claims. While the tendency to use the PSG ground in 
gender-based persecution claims may mean that women’s claims may be recognised, reliance on 
this ground perpetuates the construction of women and their experiences as social and cultural and 
as such apolitical (Edwards, 2010: 28). 
 
Gendered Politics of Interpreting the Political Opinion Ground  
 
Why then is the political opinion ground so underused in gender-based persecution cases? What is 
lost when women’s resistance to their institutional discrimination and gendered oppression is not 
seen as political? Can feminist critiques of the public/private distinction shed light on this issue? 
The distinction between public and private spheres, identified as a key feature of classical Western 
liberal thought, has been a persistent theme in feminist scholarship (see e.g. Charlesworth, 1988-
1999, Pateman 1988, Thornton, 1995). In this tradition, men have been associated with the public 
sphere, dominating the government and civil society, while women have been associated with the 
private sphere, in the character of family (Thornton, 1991: 449). The distinction between the two 
spheres correlates with the liberal notion of negative freedom that is characterised as taking the 
position that interference in people’s ‘private’ lives should be minimised and that the State’s 
responsibility in its governance should be based on the public areas.  
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 Even though the public/private distinction has been attacked as a culturally constructed 
ideology, it persists in legal thinking and is built into the language of law itself (See eg. 
Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright, 1991: 627, MacKinnon: 1989). Arguably, the public/private 
distinction explains why the political opinion has been less often used in gender-based persecution 
cases because it frames the ways in which politics is interpreted partially and narrowly within the 
refugee determination context. The measurement for an understanding of politics has been a 
masculine experience of public political activity and persecution arising from a direct link to the 
State. The traditional image of the Convention refugee is a male exile fleeing from political 
persecution from his home State. The historical context of the Convention in the aftermath of the 
Second World War during the Cold War era explains that the classic subject of the Convention was 
the Soviet dissident or the Jewish person in Germany, while the classic oppressor was the state 
(Arbel, Dauvergne and Millbank, 2014: 3). In other words, the emphasis was on public actors and 
activities whereby the persecution occurred in the public sphere and was defined by its connection 
to traditional structures of state authority (Mullaly, 2013: 202). Historically, and partly still today, 
the assumption was that the public sphere of political activity was the preserve of men, while 
women were relegated to the private sphere. These assumptions may prevent us form appreciating 
the political nature of women asylum seekers’ claims. Within the refugee determination context, 
women’s political participation continues to be marginalised and various forms of gendered 
resistance are underestimated in both policy and practice (Crawley, 2001: 79). 
 
 The Refugee Convention refers to political opinion rather than political activity (Article 1 
A). There is no requirement for the person to necessarily have expressed his opinion (Hathaway 
and Foster, 2003: 407). Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (2007: 87) have suggested that political 
opinion should be understood in a broad sense to include ‘any opinion on any matter in which the 
machinery of State, government, and policy may be engaged’.  However, even this broader 
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definition requires that the ‘State, government, or policy’ be ‘engaged’ (Edwards, 2003: 68). As 
Alice Edwards (2003: 68-69) asks: 
‘[s]hould not political opinion apply to any thought, opinion, action or inaction that can be 
seen as questioning or opposing the views of authority or society at large, whatever the 
type of authority in place?’ 
This interpretation would include any form of authority that has the power to impose law or social 
rules or to punish and discriminate against those refusing to participate in the accepted social or 
cultural practices (Edwards, 2003: 69). An inherent bias towards Western political structures, 
results in jurisprudence that shows a failure to recognise political structures and activity in non-
Western States (2003: 69). Thus it is important that the power structures and circumstances of 
asylum seekers’ experiences in their home country are recognised when refugee women make 
their claims.  
 
 Guidance to how the political opinion should be interpreted can be found in Article 19 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which enshrines the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression. The concept of political opinion is construed in the Convention as a 
human right. So, for instance, in Australia the courts recognised the right of a writer to express 
political opinion through his poetry under the convention ground (Haines, 2003: 347). A gender-
sensitive understanding of political opinion can thus include opinions on gender roles (2003: 347). 
 
 The concept of politics is critical to the process of determining refugee status under the 
political opinion ground. The idea that women are less likely than men to be involved in politics is 
implicit in the arguments that women’s claims should be made under the PSG ground (Crawley, 
2001: 18). Not only does this view perpetuate the public/private dichotomy, it fails to understand 
the context in which women participate and where their resistance often takes place (2001: 18). 
The problem lies with the way in which decision-makers use a gendered interpretation of what 
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counts as political opinion thus invalidating women’s claims (Freedman, 2015: 80). As Indra 
(1987: 3) has noted:  
‘[T]he key criteria for being a refugee are drawn primarily from the realm of public 
sphere activities, dominated by men. Where women’s presence is more strongly felt, 
there is primarily silence - silence compounded by an unconscious calculus that 
assigns the critical quality “political” to many public activities but few private ones’.  
 
Within this gendered framework, oppression of religious minorities is political, while oppression 
at home is not (Indra, 1987: 3). There are many activities which are often not represented as 
political, such as grassroots and non-governmental activism or providing food, shelter and 
medicines (Freedman, 2015: 81). These ‘non-conventional’ activities are ‘rendered political by the 
context in which they take place and the goal that they seek to achieve’ (Valji et al, 2003: 66). 
Furthermore, many women who are politically active in these ways can risk a ‘double punishment’ 
from the authorities as they are seen as opposing the regime in some way as well as opposing their 
expected gender roles (Crawley, 2000: 18).  
 
 In addition there is a tendency to misinterpret gendered forms of persecution and resistance 
as private rather than political (Crawley, 2000: 18). There is a need to recognise these types of 
activities as political if the refugee definition is to be applied to women in a gender-sensitive 
manner.  Only if women’s political participation is recognised as being tied to power relations and 
structures can women’s activities be seen as coming within the Refugee Convention definition 
(Freedman, 2015: 81). Moreover, the use of the political opinion ground in cases involving 
gender-based discrimination and violation of ‘social mores’ would result in the ‘recognition of 
diversity of women’s experiences and locate them in their political and social context (Crawley, 
1999: 329).  Kneebone (2005: 26) has argued that the tendency to characterise women’s 
experiences under the PSG ground overemphasises women’s vulnerability and dependence at the 
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expense of her political opinion. In fact if politics are understood more broadly, more gender-
based claims could be argued through the political opinion ground. This is favourable in the 
circumstances where the context gives the political meaning to women’s resistance to their 
gendered roles. To appreciate the political nature of that resistance avoids de-politising women’s 
experiences. 
Political Opinion and Forced Marriage Claims 
 
The choice of whether and whom to marry is a fundamental human right enshrined in several 
international human rights instruments. ‘Free and full consent’ in relation to marriage is included in 
the UDHR (Article 16 (2)), the UN Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age of Marriage 
and Registration of Marriage (Article 1 (2)) and the Covenant on International Civil and Political 
Rights (Article 23 (2). The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights uses 
the word ‘free’ consent (Article 10 (1). The international convention on women’s rights, the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) locates 
marriage rights in their larger political and socio-economic context. Article 16 (1) stipulates that 
state parties to the convention:  
‘[s]hall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all 
matters relating to marriage and family relations, and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of 
equality of men and women...the same right to enter into marriage... and the same right 
freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full consent’. 
 
The Committee monitoring the implementation of CEDAW further stressed in their General 
Recommendation No. 21 that ‘a woman’s right to choose a spouse and enter freely into marriage is 
central to her life and to her dignity and equality as a human being’. In these ways, CEDAW 
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addresses the historical and continued oppression and subordination of women within the context of 
marriage.  
 
 Given that the choice of whether and whom to marry is a fundamental human right, the 
absence of such consent in forced marriage is a violation of that right. Yet forced marriage 
typically includes a multitude of associated patterns of gendered violence, including rape, as well 
as denials of other human rights in addition to the lack of consent. Recently within international 
criminal law, forced marriage in conflict situations has been recognised as a crime against 
humanity.3 It has also been recognised as a contemporary form of slavery (United Nations, 2003b).  
 
Reliable statistics on forced marriage are difficult to come by because of their often 
unofficial and undocumented nature. This is also compounded by the ‘difficulty in distinguishing 
between coercion and consent in matters of marriage’ (Gill and Mitra-Kahn, 2012: 108). In relation 
to the prevalence of child brides, the International Centre for Research on Women estimates the 
number around 67 million in the world, a figure that is predicted to rise to 142 million within the 
next ten years (ICRW, 2012). Although forced marriage predominantly affects girls and young 
women4, forced marriage can occur at any age and is not solely dependent on the age and lack of 
consent but rather the intersecting societal, political and economic inequalities inherent in the girl’s 
or woman’s position in relation to others. 
 
Feminists have long recognised the multitude of pressures facing women to marry, including 
‘poverty, pregnancy and social norms and expectations that are underpinned by the patriarchal 
structures of their culture, religion and the State’ (Sundari and Gill, 2009: 172). Much of the 
persecution women face occurs in the private sphere and violence against women in its various 
forms is often supported by the ‘social legitimacy of marriage’ (Cheal, 2008: 80). In order to 
understand forced marriage within its context, the ways in which ‘women are dominated, 
 17 
economically controlled and socially disciplined by practices such as forced marriage’ need to be 
taken into account (Gill and Mitra-Kahn, 2012: 119). It is precisely in the recognition of the 
historical and continued oppression and subordination of women in the marriage context that the 
political dimension of resistance to forced marriage becomes evident. Feminist opinions are 
political opinions. 
 
 Given the clear position in international human rights law, forced marriage can be seen as a 
paradigmatic example of gender-based persecution. Indeed, many international and national 
gender guidelines characterise forced marriage as an example of gender-based persecution (IRB, 
1993, DIMA, 1996, IAA, 2000, UNHCR 2002a and UNHCR 2008). Echoing the concerns of 
NGOs in the UK (Asylum Aid, 2006), however, Dauvergne and Millbank (2010: 61) conclude that 
adjudicators in the UK and Australia rarely used these guidelines when analysing whether those 
forced to marry form a PSG or whether forced marriage constituted persecution.  
 
Case studies 
 
When an asylum seeker’s claim is refused, which happens in around 63% of cases in the UK 
(Eurostat, 2015), she may be able to appeal against the decision. From appeal to the First-tier 
Tribunal, an asylum seeker has on ‘onward’ or ‘second appeal’ to the Upper Tribunal (Immigration 
and Asylum Chamber) (UTIAC)5, though the ability to do so is limited by the recent introduction of 
fees and cuts to legal aid.6 
There are challenges to any analysis of the cases from the Upper Tribunal (and its 
predecessors) as only some of them are reported. The Upper Tribunal adopted a new determinations 
database on 2 August 2013, which provides improved access to unreported cases from 1 June 2013. 
However, the decision on whether to make a case publicly available remains under the discretion of 
the Tribunal Reporting Committee under the direction of the President of the Tribunal. As statistics 
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are not available, it is not possible to say the extent to which the reported cases are representative. 
Altogether, there were 11 reported cases that dealt with women fleeing forced marriage, or the risk 
thereof to varying degrees. While the small number of the cases precludes any causal analysis, their 
jurisprudence can give us some illustration of how, at least in some cases, the political opinion has 
been understood. Out of the 11 reported cases dealing with women’s appeals involving a forced 
marriage element between 2004 and 20147, the political opinion ground was advanced in only three 
cases: FB (Lone women - PSG – internal relocation – AA (Uganda) considered) Sierra Leone 
[2008] UKAIT 00090, FM (FGM) Sudan CG [2007] UKAIT 00060 and FM (Sudan) and JM 
(Sufficiency of protection - IFA - FGM) Kenya [2005] UKIAT 00050.  In JM (Kenya), the political 
opinion ground was not examined in any meaningful way but dismissed outright by the adjudicators 
who found that internal relocation was available. The following sections therefore focus on the two 
cases where the Tribunal did give consideration for the political opinion ground. 
 
 FB (Sierra Leone) shows most clearly the discriminatory nature of a male-centred approach 
to politics, and therefore the gendered application of international refugee law. FB came to the UK 
when she was 16 years old, having formerly lived in Bankala village in Sierra Leone with her 
parents and brothers. During the civil war, in 1999, her father was killed. Her mother was a local 
sowei (a leader of the so-called female initiation societies comprising of Sande/Bondo women in 
Sierra Leone and Liberia) (Steady, 2005) and one of the women who carried out FGM.  When FB 
was about 16 she underwent FGM and while recovering in a nearby village, she was told that her 
mother had died and that she was to replace her mother as a sowei. On her return to her village she 
told of her reluctance to the local chief. However, he insisted that she must go through the rituals to 
become a sowei and become one of his wives. FB refused and fled. 
 
 FB’s claim ultimately turned on an issue of internal relocation, as is common in these types 
of cases (Honkala, 2015). With respect to the consideration of the relevant Convention ground, the 
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Tribunal accepted that she fell within a PSG. However, she also advanced the political opinion 
ground and it is the Tribunal’s consideration of this ground that is the focus here. 
 
 The adjudicators described FB as ‘having rejected that role [becoming a sowei] because she 
is opposed to such traditional practices’, as ‘a woman who has eschewed traditional values, as part 
of a particular social group’ ‘by her resistance to accepting the prevailing cultural norms in her own 
rural society’ (¶¶ 61, 62, 71). While the adjudicators’ reasoning evidences a problematic view of 
‘culture’, there is nothing in these passages that disqualify them from describing a political 
opinion.8 
 It is therefore striking that the adjudicators in FB (Sierra Leone) went on to find that “the 
appellant, of course, holds no political opinions” [my emphasis].  They then immediately 
contradicted this in the following sentence: ‘she does not approve of FGM or wish to participate in 
the Bondo or to marry an elderly man occupying a position of local chief’ (¶ 72). The adjudicators’ 
reasoning is worth quoting at length here: 
‘[H]er motives are not political in any discernible way. That, however, is not the point. She 
has been identified as one who has rejected the traditional and customary ways of her 
village. Those traditions and customs include the recognition of the local chief in the social 
hierarchy. There is thus a political element that might be extracted both from the social 
place of Bondo and the position of the chief as the principal source of local governance. 
These so-called ‘political’ elements are relied upon to support a claim that a rejection of 
customary mores will be imputed as opposition to the existing status quo and therefore as an 
imputed political opinion giving rise to a further Convention reason’ (¶ 73). 
 
Here, the Tribunal’s reasoning seemed to recognise that the argument advanced by her was that 
rejection of becoming a sowei and resistance to forced marriage was seen as opposition to the 
existing status quo. Furthermore, they seemed to recognise the political context of the local chief in 
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the social hierarchy and the position of him as the principal source of local governance. Given this, 
however, the adjudicators continued: 
 
‘[W]e have, however, concluded that it does not, in spite of these political ‘overtones’[….] 
Our view is that there is but a peripheral connection between these political strands and her 
resistance to being a sowei and becoming involved with rituals which she considers harmful 
and demeaning (both to herself and those subjected to them) and her obvious reluctance to 
marry a man for whom she does not care’ (¶ 73). 
 
The Tribunal’s conceptualisation of politics here is very narrow. The adjudicators dismissed the 
evidence of her resistance being political, and described her actions as including ‘so-called 
‘political’ elements’ and ‘these political overtones’, but having only a ‘peripheral’ connection to her 
resistance. The implication of the Tribunal here is that FB’s resistance was not really political 
because it did not resemble the narrow male model where politics is what happens in the public 
sphere.  
 
In finally dismissing the political opinion ground claim, the adjudicators stated that: 
‘[t]he fact that the chief is, in a sense, a local politician and that the Bondo has a political 
element in its operations is not conclusive in characterising, this claim as one of imputed 
political opinion. This classification may, in large measure, be a simple matter of fact’ (¶ 
73).   
 
Furthermore, they concluded that ‘these considerations are largely academic’ (¶ 74). The 
adjudicators presented a positivist vision of law as able to separate itself from political 
considerations and able to read facts objectively. By describing the classification of the local chief 
as a politician to be ‘a simple matter of fact’, the adjudicators saw a ‘truth’ rather than a particular 
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interpretation. This in turn allowed them to find that, in any case, these questions were ‘purely 
academic’ because they had already identified ‘that the harm is related to her particular social 
group’ (¶ 74). Of course, this finding does not preclude a finding of political opinion ground 
because the Refugee Convention allows for multiple Convention grounds. More holistic 
interpretations often find that persecution engages more than one Convention ground. In fact, 
separating that which is the supposedly legal from that which are ‘purely’ academic masks the 
privileging of one type of politics over others. Essentially, then, by misinterpreting her political 
resistance as something private, the adjudicators not only perpetuated the public/private dichotomy 
but denied the asylum seeker woman’s agency.  
 
 The Tribunal’s reasoning in FB (Sierra Leone) evidences the pressing issue of gendered 
interpretation of the political opinion ground. The normative situations of political persecution that 
judges envision are moments where public figures, imagined to be men, publicly speak out against 
their government (McKinnon, 2010: 81, Musalo, 2003). However, FB’s resistance was against her 
gendered oppression: it was against what was expected of her. Not only was her resistance political, 
it was identified as such by the local political power structures of the community. As Macklin 
(1995: 260) notes: 
‘[i]dentifying women’s resistance to gender subordination as political opinion..[is]… 
profoundly feminist, if indeed one believes that the personal is political and that patriarchy 
is a system constituted primarily through power relations and not biology’. 
 
In effect, the adjudicators failed to recognise how the asylum-seeker woman’s resistance to 
particular gender roles and her refusal to be forced into marriage evidenced her political agency. 
 
 In FM (Sudan) the political opinion ground was argued in addition to a fear, if returned, of 
her daughters being subjected to FGM and forced marriage. FM gave evidence of her experience of 
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FGM and how she had became politicised against it in her teens. She joined a women’s union, 
distributed leaflets against FGM, attended a WHO meeting on FGM and participated in a 
demonstration against FGM and violence against women. As a result of her participation in the 
protest she lost her job as a teacher. After her marriage, three years later, she participated in another 
demonstration organised by the same women’s union. The police intervened and she was arrested, 
interrogated for five hours and beaten. Subsequently, FM moved to Pakistan with her husband, 
where their four children were born. In Pakistan, FM continued her activism on women’s rights. In 
1999, the family moved to the UK on her husband’s work posting, and in 2002 FM applied for 
leave to remain in the UK. FM also gave evidence of how she continued her political and human 
rights activities in the UK, joining the Sudan Human Rights Organisation, Sudanese Women’s 
Rights Group, Darfur Centre for Human rights and Development as well as the Sudanese Solidarity 
Group. She attended protests, regular meetings and did volunteer work. The country expert stated 
that there was ‘no doubt’ that FM would have been noticed and labelled as an activist, and that her 
long association with Sudanese human rights organisations meant that she was associated with 
groups that were regarded, by the regime as ‘an embarrassment’ (¶ 27). Indeed, he said, ‘they were 
regarded as real enemies of the regime’ (¶ 27). 
 
 In this case, the Tribunal had to consider whether she would face future risk of persecution 
for reasons of a political opinion. Whilst ‘accepting the genuineness of the first appellant’s interest 
in women’s rights in Sudan and her stance on the issue of FGM’, the adjudicators did not consider 
that she had ‘shown a genuine interest in overtly anti-regime activities during her time in UK’ (¶ 
149). The adjudicators arrived at this conclusion despite evidence from a country expert that the 
regime had continued to ‘resist the presence and activities of human rights groups’, that there had 
been efforts by the regime to legalise FGM, and that ‘those who campaign against FGM are almost 
inevitably drawn from those who oppose the totalitarian regime on other grounds’ (¶¶ 8, 15). There 
was evidence from the British Medical Journal that the Sudanese government was engaging in a 
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clamp down on the press which was affecting public health campaigns as the government 
considered articles discussing FGM as ‘subversive’ (¶ 10).  
 
 In dismissing any connections between FM’s political activities against FGM and the 
regime, the adjudicators fundamentally failed to appreciate the political interplay between gender 
and nation-building. The adjudicators refused to see how political power struggles, as in so many 
cases, are played out on women’s bodies and how the controlling and policing of women’s 
sexuality and their bodies are intertwined with propaganda about the ‘nation’s identity’. ‘The 
politicisation of gender identity in the context of the type of nationalism’ that President Bashir’s 
regime was engaged in is familiar to feminist critiques on nationalism and struggles over national 
identity (Crawley, 2001: 108). As Crawley (2001: 108) has noted, ‘many anti-colonial nationalist 
regimes have aimed to recover or reinvent “tradition” in order to develop a new nationalist 
consciousness’.  
 
 Indeed, President Bashir’s regime had tied FGM to ‘authenticity’ and the discourse of 
‘getting back to origins’ (Mustafa Abusharaf, 2006: 154) and was ‘openly scornful’ of international 
agreements, stating that Sudan refused to sign CEDAW because ‘the country could do without such 
strange practices’ (FM (Sudan) ¶ 14). The national identity in these types of nationalist struggles is 
often located within the private sphere, construed in “cultural” terms against the West, because 
women have been constructed as the bearers of an ‘authentic/authenticated culture’ (Crawley, 
2001:108). However, as Mogdaham (1994: 16) argues, ‘it is in the context of the intensification of 
religious, cultural, ethnic and national identity… that we see the politicisation of gender, the family 
and the position of women’. Through issuing policies that govern relations between men and 
women, from property rights to sexual and family relations this politicisation of gender becomes 
institutionalised (Crawley, 2001: 27). Seeing her political activities within their context of gender 
and nation-building explains why advocating women’s rights was seen as subversive by the regime. 
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The significance of this political process was lost on the Tribunal. As is well known, President 
Bashir was indicted to the ICC in 2009 on five counts of war crimes, including campaigns of torture 
and rape. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The UNHCR Gender Guidelines acknowledge the important interconnections between different 
Convention grounds and affirm that a claim based on transgression of social or religious norms 
could come under religion, political opinion or a PSG ground (2002, ¶ D (23)). It is important that 
women’s resistance to their gendered oppression is recognised as evidencing women’s political 
agency in order to avoid de-politicising their claims. The case of FB (Sierra Leone) is an example 
of jurisprudence whereby women’s claims are constructed socially and culturally rather than 
recognising the central political dimensions and context. FM (Sudan) similarly evidences the 
troubling tendency to downplay women’s political participation. Even when political activism 
against FGM was considered by the regime as subversive, the adjudicators did not consider that her 
political opinion was evidenced. In both cases the jurisprudence fails to recognise women’s claims 
involving power relationships that reflect the political and legal position of women.9 The decisions 
also demonstrate the ways the Tribunal examines the political opinion ground that reflects a narrow 
and masculine experience of the political.  
It is not the purpose of this article to advocate the abandonment of the PSG ground in these 
types of cases. There may be benefits for advocates and practitioners to advance this group, 
depending on the particularities of the cases. Refugee determinations are always individualistic and 
decisions on which grounds to advance depend on the particular circumstances of the case. 
However, interpretations of the PSG ground remain uncertain and when it comes to women being 
recognised as such its use is not without its difficulties. Given the policy context in which European 
governments seek to restrict the number of asylum seekers, recognition of women per se 
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constituting a PSG seems unlikely to be widely accepted (Crawley, 2001: 73, Freedman, 2015: 85). 
It also needs to be acknowledged that the desirability of such an approach is open to certain 
criticisms. Instead, framing women’s asylum claims as related to the political opinion ground may 
avoid some of the practical and political concerns associated with PSG (Crawley: 2001; 69). At the 
same time, the connection of political opinion with a refugee is so ubiquitous that refugees continue 
to be described colloquially as ‘political refugees’. It remains important therefore to challenge 
narrow, partial and gendered interpretations of what counts as political opinion. There are already 
cases based on forced marriage in which the political opinion ground has been advanced and the 
ways in which it has been interpreted can shed light on the challenges, which women may face 
when advancing this ground. Arguably, there is a need to rethink the political opinion ground as a 
basis for women’s gender-based persecution claims. 
Although much has been achieved in the field of gender and refugee law, there remains slow 
progress in terms of national tribunals utilising gender guidelines that call for gender-sensitive 
approaches to interpreting the Refugee Convention. This is of particular concern in the UK where 
after the reconstitution of the appeal tribunal in 2005, the new Tribunal considered itself not bound 
by its predecessors Gender Guidelines (Asylum Aid, 2007: 20). Clearly the issue is politically 
controversial and the governmental position on restricting avenues for migration poses significant 
challenges for refugee advocates, activists and asylum seekers. Considering that the refugee 
determination processes suffer from a number of institutional challenges, from lack of resources to 
lack of adequate training of decision-makers, perhaps critiquing the use for the political opinion 
ground may not be seen as the most strategically important goal. This does not however diminish 
the importance or the need for challenging gendered interpretations of the Convention and for 
making the case for women’s political agency and resistance to gendered oppression to be seen as 
political. In such circumstances where the resistance to forced marriage is seen by the claimant as 
an expression of their political opinion to their gendered oppression and where the state is unwilling 
or unable to offer protection of the rights of the claimant, advancing the political opinion ground 
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can be warranted. Crucially, from a feminist perspective this avoids constructing women narrowly 
as victims of their social or cultural circumstances and de-politicising their resistance, but rather 
recognises the women as active political actors.  
 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. UNHCR Executive Committee (1995) Conclusion No.77 (XLVI), (1996), Conclusion No.79 
(XLVIII),(1997),Conclusion No.81 (XLVIII), (1999) Conclusion No.87 (L), . 
 
2. The protected characteristics approach originated in the US BIA case Matter of Acosta I. & 
N. Dec. 211 (1985) but has since become dominant, having been adopted in Canada, New 
Zealand and the UK. 
3. The Prosecutor of the Special Court v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara, Santigie 
Borbor Kanu (the AFRC accused) (Appeal Judgment), SCSL-2004-16-A, Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, 22 February 2008. 
4. International data shows that young girls and women are disproportionally affected by 
forced marriage and much of this data concerns child marriage (Psaila E, 2016). The UK 
Forced Marriage Unit recorded its enquiries in 2015 to be 80% female and 20% male 
victims (UK Home Office & Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2016). 
5. For a comprehensive review of the changes see, Craig S and Fletcher M (2012). 
6. Although asylum seekers continue to have a right to legal aid, practical access to such has 
been limited by reduction in service and closures of the two major providers of immigration 
and asylum advice and representation: Refugee and Migrant Justice (RMJ) and Immigration 
Advisory Service (IAS). See, Burridge A and Gill N (2016). 
7. Cases were only examined at the Upper Tribunal level as First-tier Tribunal decisions are 
not publicly available. Research was conducted during 2010-2014, and a 10-year period was 
chosen as it represents a relatively substantial period of time where jurisprudential and 
policy trends may be gleaned and reflected upon. In the same time period, there was one 
case involving a male claimant OO (gay men; risk) Algeria CG [2013] UKUT 00063. 
8. There seems to be a tendency to assign these types of harms to culture rather than viewing 
them as a result of gender inequality. The tendency to exoticize harms has been discussed in 
the US context (Millbank J and Dauvergne C, 2010). 
9. For a critique of this issue in the Australian context, see, Kneebone S (2005). 
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